Recently, Kumari et al. pointed out that Chang et al. 's scheme "Untraceable dynamic-identity-based remote user authentication scheme with verifiable password update" has several drawbacks and does not provide any session key agreement. Hence, they proposed an improved remote user authentication scheme with key agreement based on Chang et al. protocol. They claimed that the improved method is secure. However, we found that their improvement still has both anonymity breach and smart card loss password guessing attack which cannot be violated in the ten basic requirements advocated for a secure identity authentication using smart card by Liao et al. Thus, we modify their protocol to encompass these security functionalities which are needed in a user authentication system using smart card.
Introduction
There have been many cryptographic scientists working within the field of remote user authentication using smar t card system design. A user authentication system using smart card contains two roles: the user and the server; and three protocols: registration, login and authentication, and password change. In the design principle, the user's identity cannot be revealed to a third party to ensure the login privacy. In 2014, Kumari et al. 14 found that Chang et al. scheme 15 has some shortcoming, including (1) offline password guessing attack, (2) impersonation attacks, (3) insider attack, (4) anonymity violation when the smart card is obtained by a legal user, (5) suffering the denial of service attack, and (6) doesn't provide session key agreement. Hence, they overcome the security weaknesses by proposing a new one. It possesses user anonymity property and mutual authentication, and offers a secure password change, without demanding any database kept on the server. They claimed that the proposed scheme resists various attacks, including those existed in Chang et al.s', and outperforms the other six related schemes in the aspect of security demands. Yet, upon a closer examination, we discovered that it suffers from the security weaknesses of (1) anonymity violation, and (2) the password guessing attack when the smart card is lost, still. To enhance, we modified their scheme to include these features. We will demonstrate the enhancement in this article. Besides, In 2018, Gupta et al. 22 propose a lightweight anonymous user authentication and key establishment scheme for wearable devices, which is a good design; however, we found the scheme needs to store a verifier table on the server's side. This violates one of the ten security requirements for an authentication scheme advocated by Liao et al. In addition, the two parameters MGID i , MSID i keep unchanged forever, which might incur some malicious attempts. Meanwhile, each GWNi can launch an offline X ser (the server's secret) guessing attack, because ei equals to h(
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce Kumari et al.'s Scheme. Section 3 analyzes the weaknesses of the scheme. The modifications and the security issues are demonstrated and discussed in Section 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, we give a conclusion in Section 6. 15 It also consists of two roles: the user and remote server; and three phases: registration, login, authentication, and password change phase. They claimed that their scheme not only eliminates all security vulnerabilities in Chang et al.'s scheme, but also introduces the session key agreement. In this article, we only review the registration phase, and login and authentication phase to illustrate their weaknesses. As for the definitions of use notations, please refer to the original article.
Review of Kumari

Registration Phase
When user Ui registers at server Si, both sides perform the followings.
1.
The user Ui picks his identity IDi, password PWi, and selects a random nonce b. 
Login Phase
This phase is to enable Ui access the needed resources from a server. Firstly, Ui plugs in his SCi into a card reader and infiltrates his username IDi and password PWi. SCi then verifies its real owner with the secret data it stored by using the following steps. 
Modification
From the weaknesses found in Section 3, we note that the key point is the insider can obtain the value h(y||x). To disguise it, we modify the messages in the registration phase and the login and authentication phases as follows.
Registration Phase
When a user Ui registers to the service provider server Si, both sides cooperatively perform the following steps: 1.
The user Ui picks his identifier ID i , passphrase PW i , and randomly selects a nonce b. He then calculates RPW i = h(b||PW i ) and sends {ID i , RPW i } to Si over a safe route.
2.
After obtaing the registration message from U i , S i picks two random numbers r i , y i , which are different from the other users'. From the above-mentioned, we know that we add three values G i , H i , W i and replace E i with y i ⊕h(y||x|| y i ). The others are the same as the original scheme.
Login and Authentication Phase
This phase is to enable a user U i access the needed resources from a server. U i plugs in his SC i into a card reader and infiltrates his username ID i and password PW i . SC i then verifies its real owner with the secret data stored by using the following steps.
